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Fair Market Value Concept
I
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Stephen J. Alfred1
PERVASIVENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF "FAIR MARKET VALUE"
There is probably no concept which appears more frequently or in a
greater variety of circumstances in our tax laws than does the concept of
"fair market value." It is the very essence of the federal gift and estate
taxes since fair market value' is not only the measure of what is included
in the first instance but also of what is deducted or credited in determin-
ing the amount subject to these graduated taxes.' In addition, the fair
market value of property for gift and estate tax purposes has a decisive
bearing on the income tax consequences when the property is subsequent-
ly disposed of.4
But what is frequently not realized is how the same concept pervades
the income tax aside from its interplay with the gift and estate tax. There
are many areas where it determines the amount of gross income5 and of
1. This article is based on an outline prepared by Warren E. Hacker for the Fifth Annual
Cleveland Regional Tax Institute.
2. Both the terms "fair market value" and "value" are used in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954; in each case, the meaning is the same.
3. Thus, for gift tax purposes, value is the measure of the amount of the gift, both in the
current year, INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2512 [hereinafter cited as CODE ], and in prior
years (for purposes of computing the tax in the current year), CODE § 2504 (c). It affects
the $3,000 annual per donee exclusion, CODE § 2503 (b), and the $30,000 lifetime exemption,
CODE § 2521, as well as deductions for charitable gifts, CODE § 2522, and for gifts to one's
spouse, CODE § 2523. For estate tax purposes, property is includible in the gross estate at its
value either at the date of death, CODE § 2031, or at one year after death unless disposed of in
the meantime, CODE § 2032. Value likewise affects the deductions for charitable bequests,
CODE § 2055, and for bequests to one's spouse, CODE § 2056, as well as credits against estate
tax for gift tax, CODE § 2012, estate tax on prior transfers, CODE § 2013, and foreign death
taxes, CODE § 2014. Value also affects the obtaining of an extension of time for payment of
the estate tax, where the estate consists of an interest in a closely-held business, CODE 5
6166(a).
4. CODE §§ 1014 (basis of property acquired from a decedent), 1015 (basis of property ac-
quired by gift). See also CODE §5 303 (b) (2) (capital gains or ordinary income treatment of
distributions in redemption of stock on death), 691 (a) (2) (transfer of right to receive items
of income in respect of a decedent).
5. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1957), as amended, T.D. 6416, 1959-2 CuM. BuLL. 126
[hereinafter cited as Reg. §] (compensation paid in forms other than cash); CODE 5 1001 (b)
(amount realized on sale or other disposition of property); CODE § 301(b) (1) (corporate
distributions in kind); CODE §§ 356 (a) (1), (b), 361 (b) (amount realized on "boot" trans-
actions in corporate organizations and reorganizations); CODE §§ 371(a) (2) (B), (b) (2),
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deductions.6 Often it governs the basis of property upon its later sale or
other disposition' as well as the apportionment or allocation of basis
among several properties acquired in a single transaction!8 Frequently
whether a transaction is a reorganization,' or whether a corporation is
collapsible,'" is a personal holding company," or has some other special
tax status 2 depends upon the fair market value of particular property.
Furthermore, the determination of whether a corporation is a "related
taxpayer," e.g., in determining whether losses are deductible 3 or whether
amounts realized are ordinary income or capital gain 4 depends upon the
fair market value of a corporation's stock owned by the other party.'" It
is thus apparent that this concept permeates the tax laws and is an im-
portant element in many taxable transactions.
374 (a) (2) (B) (amount realized on "boot" transactions in insolvency reorganizations);
CODE § 1031 (b) (amount realized on "boot" transactions on exchanges of property of a like
kind, insurance policies, stock for stock in the same corporation and United States obligations);
CODE § 1081 (e) (amount realized on "boot" transactions on exchanges of stock or securities
in obedience to S.E.C. orders); CODE §§ 1332(a), 1333(1) (war loss recoveries); CODE §
421 (restricted stock options); Reg. § 1.421-6 (1959), as amended, T.D. 6540, 1961-1 CuM.
BULL. 161 (non-restricted stock options). With regard to the latter, note that the unique
term "readily ascertainable" fair market value is employed; see discussion at 223 intra.
6. Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939) (casualty loss of non-business property);
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 45 B.T.A. 472 (1941), a[f'd., 133 F.2d 575 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 752 (1943) (business expenses satisfied in kind); Reg. 5 1.170-1(c) (1958)
(charitable contributions in property).
7. Heiner v. Tindle, 276 U.S. 582 (1928) (personal residence converted into rental prop-
erty); Avco Mfg. Corp., 27 T.C. 547, 556 (1956) (cost basis of property received in an ex-
change); Ambassador Petroleum Co., 28 B.T.A. 868, 873 (1933); rev'd on other grounds,
81 F.2d 474 (9th Cit. 1936); CODE § 1053 (property acquired before March 1, 1913. Cf.
Reg. § 1.167(f)-i (1956) (basis for depreciation of personal residence converted to rental
property). In the absence of special provisions as to basis, which provisions appear in Sub-
chapters C (CODE §§ 301-95, relating to corporate distributions and adjustments), K (CODE
§§ 701-71, relating to partnerships), 0 (CODE §§ 1001-111, relating to gains and losses on
disposition of property), and P (CODE §5 1201-49, relating to capital gains and losses), the
basis of property is the cost of such property. CODE § 1012.
8. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-5 (1956) (after a purchase for a lump sum), 1.334-1(c) (4) (viii)
(1955), as amended, T.D. 6298, 1958-2 CUM. BULL. 138 (after a Kimball-Diamond liquida-
tion), 1.358-2(a) (2), (a) (3), (b) (2) (1955) (after a tax-free reorganization exchange).
9. CODE § 368(a) (2) (B) (qualification as a "C" type reorganization).
10. CODE 5§ 341(c) (1) (A), (e) (1) (C), (e) (8).
11. CODE 55 542(a) (2), 543(a) (6).
12. CODE 55 552(a) (2), 6035(b) (foreign personal holding company); CODE §§ 851-
(b) (4), (e) (1) (regulated investment company); CODE § 856(c) (5) (real estate invest-
ment trust).
13. CODE 5 267(b).
14. CODE 55 1235 (d) (sale of patents), 1239(a) (sale of depreciable property). See also
CODE § § 302(b) (2) (redemption of stock), 304(c) (redemption through use of related
corporations), 306(a) (1) (A) (disposition of § 306 stock, 318(a) (1) (C) (attribution of
ownership under Subchapter C).
15. In addition, the allocation of earnings and profits after a spin-off depends upon the fair
market value of the property involved, Reg. 5 1.312-10(a) (1955), as do certain limitations
on net operating loss carryovers, CODE §§ 382(a) (1), (b) (1) (B), (b) (2).
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ELEMENTS OF FAIR MARKET VALUE
Definition
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of fair market value in our
tax structure, there is no place in the Internal Revenue Code, as volumi-
nous and detailed as it has become, which defines the term. The reason
for this is obvious, since everyone, including Congress in its frequent use
of the phrase, knows what it means - or at least thinks so.
Fair market value is the price at which a sale would take place be-
tween a willing seller and a willing buyer dealing at arm's length in a
free market, neither being under compulsion to deal and both having
reasonable knowledge of the material facts.' " Like so many concepts in
our tax structure, and elsewhere in the law, there is no disagreement
about the definition. The real difficulty arises in applying it in the par-
ticular case. Thus, the problems which arise regarding the fair market
value of property are not so much conceptual as practical, not so much
problems of principle as problems of proof."
Recognizing that fair market value involves more problems of proof
than of principle, it is necessary that one examine the elements of the
classic definition if for no other reason than to know what kinds of evi-
dence are pertinent.
Market Requirement
In considering the market requirement in the definition of fair market
value, it should be noted that different concepts and methods are in-
volved, depending on whether the item to be valued is property traded
on an organized exchange, such as a securities or commodities exchange,
property not sold frequently enough or in such volume to be listed on
an exchange, or property sold infrequently, if at all.
In the case of property such as stocks, bonds, or commodities traded
on an active, organized market, the problem of establishing fair market
value can be comparatively free of complications. In such a case, a well-
defined, actual market exists. Thus, if the value of one hundred shares
of General Motors Corporation stock were at issue, the quoted selling
price per share on the New York Stock Exchange as of the applicable
date would suffice.' " Such property is fungible enough that sales of
other such shares is presumptive evidence of the price that could be ob-
tained for the particular stock.
This protection is applicable even if shares of the same stock in ques-
16. Reg. §§ 1.170-1(c) (1958) (income tax), 20.2031-1(b) (1958) (estate tax),
25.2512-1 (1958) (gift tax).
17. Whitlow v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1936).
18. Estate of Leonard B. McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (1940); Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(b),
25.2512-2(b) (1958).
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tion were not traded on the relevant date, so long as they were traded
within a reasonable period before and after such date. 9 The presence
of a large number of buyers and sellers dealing at arm's length through
such an exchange establishes a "market" based on actual sales and thus a
method of determining value which is generally considered reliable."0
It must be recognized however, that even in the above situations, the
assumption is made that the property was sold at a time when, in fact,
it was not sold.2' This requires the further assumption that the property
to be valued is substantially similar to the property actually sold.22 In
the example of the General Motors stock, this is not a serious problem.
But if a less active stock, or property sold only infrequently, were in-
volved, this assumption of similarity may be of questionable validity.
Consequently, great care must be taken in assuming a market. Even in
the case of listed securities, the number of actual sales or the breadth and
depth of the market may be too limited to afford sufficient grounds to
assume that market price establishes value.23 Thus, if only a few actual
sales were made on the relevant date, there may not have been "enough
competition between buyers and sellers to prevent the exigencies of an
individual from being exploited."24  Similarly, where the number of
shares to be valued is of such size that supply exceeds evidence of demand,
the existing market price may not be a proper indication of the price that
would be received if the property were actually sold. 6
Similar problems arise in the valuation of property other than securi-
ties as, for example, real estate, where evidence of sales prices of other
parcels is significant only to the extent that such other property is sub-
stantially similar to that in question.
In determining the fair market value of property which is not actively
traded on an organized exchange and which is sold only infrequently, the
complications increase. In this situation, expert testimony26 is generally
relied on to establish the price at which the property would change hands
if there were a market; that is, if there were numerous sales and willing
and knowledgeable buyers and sellers available. In substance, this en-
19. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(b), (d), 25.2512-2(b), (d) (1958).
20. Estate of Leonard B. McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (1940); Gordon, What Is Fair Market
Value?, 8 TAx L. REV. 35, 37 (1952).
21. "[The test is hypothetical in that it assumes a sale when there has been no sale but only
a gift." Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Conn. 1954). Cf. Whitlow
v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 569, 572 (8th Cit. 1936); Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683,
684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1934).
22. Heiner v. Crosby, 24 F.2d 191, 193 (3d Cir. 1928).
23. Ibid.; Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(e), 25.2512-2(e) (1958).
24. Helvering v. Walbridge, 70 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 594 (1934).
25. See discussion of "blockage" at 184 infra.
26. E.g., Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Conn. 1954); James Couzens,
11 B.T.A. 1040 (1928).
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deavor is directed toward establishing the intrinsic worth of the property,
because a true "market" does not exist. 7 Thus, in valuing stock of a
close corporation not listed on an exchange and not frequently traded,
some of the factors to be considered are earning power, production, sales,
management, and position in industry.2" Restrictions on the use or dis-
position of such property must also be considered.29 In valuing a part-
nership or other interest in a business, the approach is similar, con-
sidering in addition the underlying asset value.30 In none of the above
situations, however, are non-commercial or subjective considerations to
be taken into account.3
Implicit in the introduction of such evidence is the premise that the
price paid for the property on the hypothetical market would be its in-
trinsic worth. This assumption in turn depends on the supposition that
buyers and sellers would exist in sufficient numbers, with sufficient
knowledge of the material facts, and with sufficient willingness to deal,
so that the price achieved would in fact represent intrinsic worth.
Thus, where the property to be valued is sold with such frequency
and in such volume that it is listed on an exchange, such exchange con-
stitutes a "market" based on actual sales. The valuation problem is there-
fore essentially one of establishing the similarity of the particular prop-
erty to that actually sold. Where, however, the property to be valued is
not sold frequently and is not listed on an exchange, the problem is diffi-
cult and generally requires expert testimony as to the significance of
limited sales, if they exist, as well as to earning power and similar factors
tending to establish intrinsic worth, which, it is assumed, would be the
"market" price if a market actually existed.
Fairness Requirement
The requirement of fairness is raised primarily in situations where
there is a conflict between intrinsic worth and actual sales prices based
either on an existing, active market such as a stock exchange or on a
putative market derived from limited transactions. For example, stock
prices quoted on major exchanges do not necessarily bear any relation to
the intrinsic worth of such stock. On occasion, the taxpayer has argued
that the stock market quotations should be disregarded in favor of in-
27. Helverine v. Kendrick Coal & Dock Co., 72 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294
U.S. 716 (1935).
28. James Couzens, 11 B.T.A. 1040, 1169-72 (1928); Reg. 5§ 20.2031-2(f), 25.2512-2(f)
(1958); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237.
29. E.g., Kline v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1942). Cf. Gary Black, 38 T.C. No.
68 (Aug. 22, 1962), disallowing a loss deduction on the sale of real estate on the ground that
the decline in value was due to restrictive covenants imposed by the taxpayer-vendor.
30. Reg. §§ 20.2031-3, 25.2512-3 (1958).
31. Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 715 (D. Conn. 1954).
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trinsic worth, which is usually lower. 32 In such a situation, the courts are
not likely to give recognition to this argument.3" Although
it may be irrational for buyers on the stock market to pay more for a stock
than the per share value of the underlying corporate assets, [the courts]
are concerned only with what that stock will fetch on such a market
even though it be irrational.3 4
One of the most striking illustrations of this problem arose out of
the McKesson & Robbins scandal. 5 For several years a corporate offi-
cial had been recording non-existent inventories on the books. The tax-
payer contended that the prices at which McKesson & Robbins stock
was traded on the New York Stock Exchange was therefore substantially
in excess of intrinsic worth and should be disregarded. The court refused
to do so. In support of the court's holding, it must be pointed out that
the stock could have been sold for the "market" price, whether or not
such price was fair, and thus it was not unfair to impose the tax on that
basis.
Contrasted to the above situation is the one where the property to be
valued is not traded on an exchange, although similar property is sold on
occasion. Thus, in the case of insurance policies, and more particularly,
single-premium life insurance policies, it has been held that the proper
measure of value is not the price at which it could be sold - that is, the
cash surrender value - but the higher figure of cost, since the latter was
the only figure which fairly comprehended all the purposes to which the
property could be put, including the right to hold the property as well as
to sell it.36
One further situation that bears consideration concerns the valuation
of notes. Notes are frequently sold to financial institutions and others.
Thus, valuation could be established on the basis of sales prices, since
there are numerous willing and knowledgeable buyers and sellers. Never-
theless, for tax purposes, the price at which notes might change hands
32. E.g., Rogers v. Strong, 72 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621 (1934) (stock
prices during 1929 boom rejected).
33. Estate of Leonard B. McKitterick, 42 B.T.A. 130 (1940); Estate of Millie L. Wright, 43
B.T.A. 551 (1941) (McKesson & Robbins scandal); Frank Champion, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
253 (1960) (stock issued for presumed consideration which was never paid). But cf. Heiner
v. Crosby, 24 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1928), reaching a contrary result where intrinsic value was
higher than market price.
34. Estate of Leonard B. McKitterick, supra note 33, at 138.
35. Estate of Millie L. Wright, 43 B.T.A. 551 (1941); Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?,
8 TAx L. REV. 35, 37 (1952).
36. "All of the economic benefits of a policy must be taken into consideration in determining
its value for gift-tax purposes. . . . Cost is . . . here . . . the only suggested criterion which
reflects the value to the owner of the entire bundle of rights in a single-premium policy - the
right to retain it as well as the right to surrender it." Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254,
257-58 (1941). (Emphasis added.) See also Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 924 (1954), holding that the cost to the taxpayer of
diamonds of rare magnitude was a proper measure of value for gift tax purposes.
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